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Abstract
Background: In 2014, a revision of the national medical tariffs for inpatient health care services took place in Iran,
and a new hotline was set up to report informal payments. It was expected that such measures would eliminate or
decrease informal payments prevalence. This study estimates the prevalence of informal payments for inpatient
health care services in the post-reform period, explores factors associated with informal payments and examines
patients’ and healthcare providers’ views regarding the causes of informal payments and possible practical solutions
for their reduction.
Methods: We surveyed by phone patients who used inpatient health care services in seven Iranian hospitals in
2016. Descriptive and regression analyses were used to estimate the prevalence and determine factors associated
with informal payments. We conducted a qualitative analysis through thematic analyses based on focus group
discussions and in-depth interviews.
Results: Of 2696 respondents, 14% reported paying informally for inpatient services. Informal payments were reported
more frequently among private hospital users, given more frequently to physicians in public teaching hospitals and
‘other staff’ in private hospitals, in the form of cash and voluntary. Being an adult, hospital or treatment type, being
insured, and household head’s education influenced the probability of paying informally. The amount paid informally
was associated with being insured, the educational status of the household’s head, household size, service, and
hospital types. Based on qualitative findings, the leading causes of informal payments reported by patients and
healthcare providers can be categorized into four groups - financing challenges; governance challenges; service
delivery challenges; and actors and stakeholders. Modifying, adjusting and applying policy interventions; supervision,
monitoring and evaluation; and actors and stakeholders were identified as possible solutions for tackling informal
payment in the inpatient health care services.
Conclusion: The prevalence of informal patient payments for inpatient services in the post-reform period seems to
have reduced; however, they remain to be common. Regular monitoring, reviewing of payment policies to the
physicians, informing patients, changing the behaviour of healthcare providers and patients, and developing ethical
guidelines to prevent informal payments were suggested for reduction and elimination of informal payments in the
Iranian healthcare sector.
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Background
Informal payments (IPs) in healthcare can be defined as
a payment made by a patient (or anyone else acting on
behalf of this patient) to a provider (person or institu-
tion) that is paid in addition and/or in excess to what is
officially being determined as a service fee [1, 2]. IPs can
be made in cash, given as a gift or by providing a service.
A considerable amount of out-of-pocket payments in
the health systems of many countries is informal [3, 4].
IPs are one of the significant obstacles in reforming
healthcare systems due to their possible adverse effects
on equity [5, 6]. IPs can also lead to an undefined finan-
cial relationship between a physician (and other medical
staff) and a patient, impose a double fiscal burden onto a
patient and their family and, in the long run, can damage
the community’s trust into health care services providers
[7]. Moreover, IPs may increase the catastrophic health
expenditure, overshadow the availability and utility of
services, decrease the quality of services, increase cor-
ruption, decline the confidence and transparency in the
system, cause suspicion over the responsibilities of insti-
tutions and negatively impact healthcare financing sys-
tems [8–11]. Due to possible consequences, reducing the
prevalence of IPs for health care services should remain
the top priority for health policymakers. The Islamic Re-
public of Iran (Iran) has a complex healthcare system
that includes multiple providers of health care services,
financed by public and private sources, and has three
levels of health care services provision. For inpatient ser-
vices, a provider payment mechanism is historically
rooted in salaries and the fee-for-service payment model.
From 2010 to 2015, the Current Health Expenditure
(CHE) per capita decreased from 380 to 366 USD; public
expenditure on health as percent of CHE increased from
32 to 53%, and the share of out-of-pocket expenditure
from CHE decreased from 59 to 40% [12]. Nonetheless,
despite numerous reforms and policy interventions to
improve healthcare financing, equitable financing re-
mains to be one of the significant challenges faced by
the country’s healthcare system [13]. The Iranian health-
care sector also struggles with inefficient risk pooling ar-
rangements and uncapped fee-for-service charges for
both inpatient and outpatient services [14–16].
Another remaining challenge is a high prevalence of IPs
that can range from 7 to 10% in a hospital department to
20–48% in the whole hospital [17]. One of the main
causes of IPs in Iran is low medical tariffs - tariffs incor-
rectly estimated and not reflect the actual total costs of
healthcare services) [11, 18]. Recognizing the possible
negative effects of IPs and their root causes, the Iranian
health policymakers attempted to tackle IPs by revising
the national medical tariffs. During the last decades, such
revision took place several times. However, the revision
process was neither comprehensive nor systematic, and, as
a result, did not yield into a list of well-defined relative
and monetary values for medical procedures and services
that would reflect real actual costs [19].
The most recent attempt to tackle IPs was made during
the implementation of the latest healthcare sector reform
in 2014, known as the Health Transformation Plan (HTP).
The HTP reform, developed by the Iranian Ministry of
Health and Medical Education (MoHME), included sev-
eral interventions to boost the quality and equity in the
healthcare delivery system. Two elements of the HTP re-
form addressed IPs: national medical tariff revision and
setting up a new hotline “1690” to report IPs. The revision
of national medical tariffs was conducted based on feed-
back from the major healthcare sector stockholders and
aimed to reach actual medical costs [20]. All inpatient ser-
vices that are provided through the Iranian health system
were covered under the new national medical tariffs
schedule. This new “1690” hotline was created to provide
a feedback mechanism and enable patients to file com-
plaints related to an extra payment requested by any med-
ical staff for any medical service in excess of those
specified in the medical tariffs schedule. Following a com-
plaint, experts would conduct a speedy investigation to
check all cases and related health care providers. Overall,
it was expected that the implementation of the newly re-
vised national medical tariffs schedule coupled with a new
hotline would eliminate the IPs or at least decrease their
prevalence. Whether this happened or not remains to be a
very relevant but understudied question for the health pol-
icymakers. This study examines the evidence to provide
an answer to this question. It is worth noting that the
evaluation of the HTP itself as reform is outside the scope
of this paper.
The aims of the study were: [1] to estimate the preva-
lence and factors associated with reported IPs for in-
patient health care services in the post-HTP period; and
[2] to explore perceptions of patients and healthcare
providers regarding the causes of IPs in inpatient set-
tings and practical policy solutions that could be imple-
mented in Iran based on these perceptions.
Methods
We used a sequential explanatory approach to analyze
primary data collected during a national cross-sectional
survey, supplemented by a focus group discussion, semi-
structured in-depth interviews, and short interviews on
the causes of IPs for inpatient services in the period fol-
lowing the revision of the national medical tariffs sched-
ule, as well as possible practical solutions to eliminate
them. Both qualitative and quantitative data collection
took place in 2016.
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Quantitative phase
To address aim [1], the quantitative data were collected
using a questionnaire that was previously tested and
used in the Iranian setting [21], which included IPs
questions used in other studies as well [7, 22, 23]. Our
respondents were patients (or their family members)
who were discharged from a hospital within one month
prior to the start of the data collection. Respondents
were interviewed by phone by a group of trained inter-
viewers using the local language spoken in a correspond-
ing province. The questionnaire included questions on
demographics and patient insurance characteristics; the
duration of the patient’s stay; experience of giving IPs,
i.e. who received the payment (physician or other staff,
which included nurses, midwife, security guards, thera-
pists, technicians, clerical staff, and administrative staff),
reason for paying IPs (requested by a service provider or
done by patient’s initiative), form of payment (cash or
in-kind), and the approximate amount of payment (for
those who paid in cash).
Participants were selected using a multiple-stage ran-
dom sampling technique to acquire a country-
representative sample from various Iranian hospitals. First,
we purposefully selected four large provinces from north,
south, west and east of Iran as clusters and considered all
existing hospitals there. Second, in each province, we ran-
domly selected two hospitals that served as the main
healthcare providers in that province, irrespective of their
organization type and ownership category (public teach-
ing, private or affiliated with the social security
organization). Hospitals declining to participate in the
study were removed from the list and replaced by another
randomly selected hospital. Third, using a hospital’s dis-
charge list (last month), respondents were selected using
systematic random sampling.
A cluster sample size (n = 312) was calculated assum-
ing 5% precision, 95% confidence level, and 28.2% ex-
pected IPs proportion (tested by us in a pilot study on
100 respondents). Assuming the intra-cluster correlation
coefficient 0.002, the design effect was 1.622. We set ex-
pected non-response rate to 30% to account for the sen-
sitive nature of the topic, possible difficulties in
accessing the target population, and the highest previ-
ously reported non-response rate for telephone inter-
views on IPs in Iran (27.3%) [24, 25]. The final target
sample size was at a minimum of 2888 respondents.
With the Gaal’s definition for IPs in mind [8], all extra
payments (whether given in cash or in-kind, voluntary
or upon request) over the determined formal tariff
schedule paid by the patient (or their family members)
were considered as IPs. It is worth noting that since IPs
constitute a very sensitive topic and in fact are illegal
(following the Iranian legislation and particularly after
the revision of the medical tariffs schedule), it was very
unlikely that respondents would answer questions re-
garding IPs freely and honestly. To account for that, we
inquired about IPs using the following exact formulation
of a question for cash payments: “Did you or any of your
family members make any payments in addition (extra)
to the registered formal payment shown in your hospital
bill to a physician or other hospital staff?”. The follow-
up questions asked to specify whether these payments
were made to a physician, and/or other medical staff, as
well as the amount paid. For non-cash in-kind payments,
the follow-up question was formulated as follows: “Apart
from payment in cash, what kind of other payments did
you make?”, giving the following predefined options:
flower and gift, goods, or other services. When asking
these questions, we did not exclude cases with children’s
hospitalization.
The prevalence of IPs was estimated using descriptive
statistics. The two-part model was used to analyze fac-
tors associated with the likelihood of paying IPs (probit
model) and its amount (generalized linear model with
gamma distribution and log link function). All quantita-
tive data were analyzed using STATA SE 15.1 (Stata
Statistical Software: Release 15. College Station, TX: Sta-
taCorp LLC, 2017).
Qualitative phase
To address aim [2] and to obtain an in-depth under-
standing of the reasons behind IPs prevalence for in-
patient services after revising medical tariffs schedules,
the qualitative data were collected by conducting a focus
group discussion with 12 participants and 18 face-to-
face semi-structured in-depth interviews. Participants’
details can be found in Additional file 1. All participants
were purposefully selected among healthcare providers
and health policymakers (i.e. physicians, health insurance
organizations and MoHME officials, managers and heads
of hospitals, heads of financial and administrative affairs
in hospitals, faculty members and researchers), accord-
ing to their position and participation in HTP imple-
mentation, as well as their work experience in the
inpatient services. Moreover, additional short phone in-
terviews were conducted with a subsample of 364 re-
spondents who reported paying IPs, selected from the
primary survey sample.
All face-to-face interviews were carried out until the data
saturation point was reached, meaning that there were no
new codes identified in the successive interviews. The inter-
views were conducted using a semi-structured interview
guide containing the results of the quantitative part of the
study. Participants were asked to answer why the prevalence
of IPs is still considerable despite the revision of the medical
tariffs schedule; what factors could possibly be influencing
this phenomenon; are there any other factors (other than the
medical tariffs schedule) that policymakers have not yet
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addressed; and what practical policy options, intervention
and/or solutions can be used to eliminate and/or to prevent
this type of payments in the healthcare sector. All interviews
and focus group discussions were recorded only after obtain-
ing verbal consent from the respondents. The recorded dis-
cussions and interviews were then transcribed verbatim
following each session. Also, various documents, including
the bylaws, newspapers, rules and regulations, as well as na-
tional related reports, were reviewed. All qualitative data
were analyzed through inductive (remaining open to accom-
modate emerging themes) and deductive (framework analysis
method) approaches. We applied a framework analysis
method and followed five main steps: familiarisation, identi-
fying a thematic framework, indexing, charting and mapping,
and interpretation. MAXQDA12 software was used to
organize the analysis (VERBI Software. MAXQDA 2018.
Berlin: VERBI Software, 2017.).
We also considered the quality criteria, including cred-
ibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability and
reflexivity for the qualitative research. To ensure cred-
ibility, we had a prolonged engagement with all partici-
pants to build the necessary level of trust. We also used
the triangulation strategy. For transferability, we used a
thick description of the context and experiences of par-
ticipants. Audit trails were used to ensure dependability
and confirmability. While conducting qualitative studies,
researchers considered the process of critical self-
reflection about preferences and preconceptions as re-
searchers to ensure reflexivity.
The ethics approval and consent to participate in this
study were obtained. The objectives of the study, data
collection methods, data recording, and the role of re-
searchers and interviewees were explained to all partici-
pants. Oral informed consent was obtained from all
individual participants before inclusion in the study. The
data were fully anonymized before the analysis and par-
ticipants were assured about anonymity.
Results
IPs: who is paying and how much
Two thousand six hundred ninety-six patients partici-
pated in the study (response rate: 93.3%), with 68.2%
from public teaching, 19.5% from private and 12.3%
from social security hospitals. The average age of partici-
pants and heads of households were 43.2 and 47.6 years,
respectively. The mean of household’s income was 28,
978,641 IRR per month (ca. 960 USD). Other socio-
economic details can be found in Additional file 2.
Overall, 14% of respondents incurred IPs. Of all re-
spondents, 4.1% paid only to physicians, 8.1% paid only
to other staff, while 1.8% paid to both doctors and other
staff. IPs prevalence was highest in private hospitals
(7.2%), followed by public teaching (6.5%) and social se-
curity (0.3%) hospitals.
Among those who reported IPs, payments were made
more frequently to other staff only (57.9%) than to phy-
sicians only (29.4%) or paying to both other staff and a
physician (12.7%), with the highest mean amount being
paid to the physicians. In public teaching hospitals, IPs
were given more frequently to physicians only (57.1%),
in private hospitals to other staff only (81.4%), and in so-
cial security hospitals also to physicians only (55.6%). Pa-
tients also seemed to pay informally more for inpatient
services in public hospitals than in private or social se-
curity hospitals (Table 1).
Results regarding forms and incentives for IPs by hos-
pital type and provider should be treated with caution
due to a high level of missing responses. Among those
who responded to these questions, most IPs were made
voluntary and in the form of cash (Table 2). This obser-
vation seems to be valid for all types of hospitals and
when paid to other staff. For physicians, users reported
paying IPs upon request more frequently than paying
voluntarily.
IPs: factors associated with paying informally and the
amount paid
Based on the results of the probit regression analyses
(Table 3), the following factors decreased the probability
of paying IPs: being an adult (p < 0.001) (reference -
child), using social security hospital services (=0.001)
(reference - public), and residing in a household where
household head had a high school education level (p <
0.001) (reference – primary level education). Living in a
city (p = 0.015) (reference - country’s capital, Tehran),
being insured (p = 0.003), using private hospital (p =
0.003) (reference – public hospital), as well as using
medical treatment and diagnostic measures or other ser-
vices (all p < 0.001) (reference - surgery) increased the
probability of paying IPs. Other factors in the model did
not have a significant relationship (p > 0.05) with IPs
prevalence, or the coefficient values were extremely low.
We looked additionally at the probability of paying IPs
with cash either to a doctor or other medical staff, or ei-
ther; the probability of paying informally in-kind to ei-
ther; as well as the probability of paying informally
either in cash or in-kind to either (Additional file 3).
Overall, being an adult, living in the city other than the
capital, being insured, type of the hospital and treatment,
as well as the household head’s education level, all
remained to be statistically significantly associated with
the probability of paying IPs. There was a slight variation
in the direction of the association of IPs predictors when
analyzing doctors and other staff separately; however,
other than that, the additional regressions only con-
firmed the main findings.
A positive association of the amount paid informally
was found with being insured (p < 0.001) and living with
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a household head who had a high school education level
(Table 3). Characteristics such as visiting private and so-
cial security hospitals (compared to the public) (p =
0.018 and p = 0.025 respectively), as well as having a
Caesarean section (p < 0.001) and living in a bigger
household (p = 0.002) were all negatively associated with
the amount of IPs. Other factors in the model did not
have a significant relationship (p > 0.05) with IPs
amounts, or the coefficient values were extremely low.
IPs: perceptions of the causes of IPs and ways forward by
healthcare providers and users
Participants reported that the frequency of IPs has dra-
matically decreased following the implementation of the
revised medical tariffs schedule. For example, one par-
ticipant stated, “Elimination of under the table payments
was like a great surgery, if two years ago this issue was
mentioned, fortunately, nowadays in a public sector, the
amount of under the table [payments] for physicians is
nearly zero” [Senior health policy maker]. However, they
believed that the full elimination of IPs, as shown by our
quantitative analyses, has not yet been achieved and IPs
are still present. “Even after the implementation of HTP,
informal payments exist, even though the healthcare sys-
tem policymakers believed and sometimes said that they
could eliminate informal payments, although the amount
may be lower than earlier” [Health Policymaker]. Ac-
cording to the interviewees, the leading causes of IPs
categorized into four groups: [1] financing challenges,
[2] governance challenges, [3] service delivery challenges,
and [4] actors and stakeholders.
(1) Financing challenges of the Iranian health system
Most of the interviewees mentioned that irrational tar-
iffs are the challenge that has affected the Iranian health-
care system for more than thirty years. They declared
that the revision of the tariffs schedule that occurred
under the HTP could have potentially decreased the
prevalence of IPs but would not effectively eliminate it.
They also mentioned that after the implementation of
the HTP, despite an increase in the amounts paid to
Table 1 Informal payments for health care services by hospital type
All respondents Among those who reported paying IPs
Used services
in hospital
Given IPs to either physician
and/or other staff (n = 2696)

































1839 (68.2) 175 (9.5) 164.9 ± 224.9 100 (57.1) 284.9 ± 243.5 57 (32.6) 3.9 ± 18.4 18 (10.3) 94.6 ± 110.6
Private 525 (19.5) 194 (36.9) 30.5 ± 67.1 6 (3.1) 66.3 ± 0 158 (81.4) 12.2 ± 46.3 30 (15.5) 121.8 ± 85.9
Social
Security
332 (12.3) 9 (2.7) 6.3 ± 7.9 5 (55.6) 16.6 ± 0 4 (44.4) 1.2 ± 0.6 0 (0.0) 0 ± 0.0
All 2696 (100) 378 (14.0) 90.5 ± 172.1 111 (29.4) 269.7 ± 242.6 219 (57.9) 9.9 ± 40.6 48 (12.7) 111.6 ± 95.7
Source: Authors’ analyses of data from Informal Patient Payments dataset
Notes: * “Other staff” category includes nurses, midwives, security guards, therapists, technicians, clerical staff, and administrative staff. 1 USD = 30,170 IRR in 2016.
Reported frequencies are not valid percentages and take all eligible respondents in a group as a denominator, mean values are calculated for valid responses,
using the number of service users per type of a hospital as the denominator. The total values of frequencies of payments may vary because of missing answers
(lack of response, refusal to respond or respondents did not know the answer). IPs include both cash and/or in-kind contributions, unless stated otherwise
Table 2 Informal payments for health care services by type of payments
Hospital type All (user N = 2696) Public teaching (use N = 1839) Private (user N = 525) Social Security (user N = 332)
Who received IP Physician Other staff* Physician Other staff* Physician Other staff* Physician Other staff*
Type of payment Observed frequency, n (%) Observed frequency, n (%) Observed frequency, n (%) Observed frequency, n (%)
Form Cash 151 (5.6) 256 (9.5) 114 (6.2) 72 (3.9) 32 (6.1) 180 (34.3) 5 (1.5) 4 (1.2)
In kind 0 (0.0) 24 (0.9) 0 (0.0) 24 (1.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Cash and in-kind 8 (0.3) 11 (0.4) 4 (0.2) 3 (0.2) 4 (0.8) 8 (1.5) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Incentive Voluntary 36 (1.3) 265 (9.8) 36 (2.0) 99 (5.4) .ª 162 (30.9) .ª 4 (1.2)
By request 71 (2.6) 36 (1.3) 37 (2.0) 10 (0.5) 32 (6.1) 26 (5.0) 2 (0.6) .ª
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from Informal Patient Payments dataset
Notes: * “Other staff” category includes nurses, midwives, security guards, therapists, technicians, clerical staff, and administrative staff. 1 USD = 30,170 IRR in 2016.
Reported frequencies are not valid percentages and take all eligible respondents in a group as a denominator. The total values of frequencies of payments may
vary because of missing answers (lack of response, refusal to respond or respondents did not know the answer).. ª indicates missing answers, where no answers in
that category were given
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medical tariffs, inequity increased among different med-
ical groups. Some of the interviewees believed that in-
creasing medical tariffs as the intervention to control IPs
could not be effective without complementary interven-
tions. They reported that despite multiple revisions, tar-
iffs remain irrational, and a revision based on scientific
and rational principles of determining health services
tariffs is needed. “In addition to the strict dealing with
this phenomenon, the actual price of medical services
that would consider interdisciplinary equity should be
determined, and insurance organizations should try to
increase effective coverage of all people. In this way, we
can fundamentally combat under the table payments,
but now dealing with this phenomenon is case by case…”
[Health Policy maker]. “The prominent issue in the
healthcare system is the disproportion between the
provision of health services and their actual price. Al-
though the medical tariffs underwent considerable
change during the implementation of the HTP, as com-
pared to the past revisions, the medical tariffs still do not
correspond with economic foundations in the healthcare
system” [Health Insurance Officer].
The payment system, especially for secondary and ter-
tiary healthcare services, which is based on fee for ser-
vice, is another problem in the healthcare system.
Participants believed that the fee for service payment
system has caused induced medical interventions, dis-
crimination in physician admission, over-prescription of
drugs and resulted in ineffective and expensive services.
They mentioned that eliminating a direct relationship
between a patient and a provider is a way to move to-
wards the elimination of IPs in the Iranian healthcare
sector. “If we want to minimize the IPs to the level of
high-income countries, we should expand public insur-
ance coverage. The health budget should be raised from
the public budget. We should not rely on direct payments
as a source of health care services financing” [Health In-
surance Officer].
According to some interviewees, if the share of pub-
lic funding in the CHE does not raise (currently the
Table 3 Factors associated with IPs prevalence and amount paid (based on Probit and GLM)
Characteristics Part 1 Paying informally with money, yes/no Yes = 1 (Probit) Part 2 Amount paid informally GLM
Variables Coef (SE) p-value Marginal effects (SE) Coef(SE) p-value
Sex, female −0.14(0.10) 0.185 −0.01(0.18) − 0.57 (0.29) 0.052
Adult, yes −0.88(0.15) 0.000 −0.14(0) 1.25 (1.05) 0.236
Residence (ref: country’s capital, Tehran)
Other city 0.26(0.11) 0.015 0.03(0.01) 0.06 (0.29) 0.827
Village −0.29(0.25) 0.228 −0.03(0.19) 0.22(0.63) 0.722
Insured, yes 0.75(0.25) 0.003 0.06(0) 4.76(0.40) 0.000
Hospital stay, days −0(0) 0.001 −0(0.86) − 0(0) 0.000
Hospital type (ref: public)
Private 0.38(0.13) 0.003 0.05(0.01) −1.13(0.48) 0.018
Social −0.7(0.21) 0.001 −0.06(0) −2.78(1.24) 0.025
Hospital service (ref: surgery)
Medical treatment 0.87(0.15) 0.000 0.09(0) 1.11(1.02) 0.277
Diagnostic measures 0.80(0.19) 0.000 0.08(0) 1.49(1.11) 0.182
Caesarean Section 0.43(0.55) 0.434 0.04(0.5) −5.290.98) 0.000
Other 1.47(0.2) 0.000 0.20(0) 0.50(0.97) 0.603
Household size 0.01(0.02) 0.638 0(0.64) − 0.15(0.05) 0.002
Household income, monthly 0(0) 0.000 0(0) 0(0) 0.183
Household head, age −0.03(0) 0.000 −0(0) 0(0) 0.735
Household head, an education level (ref: primary)
High school −0.60(0.14) 0.000 −0.06(0) 0.92 0.023
College −0.04(0.13) 0.740 −0(0.74) 0.11 0.698
N of respondents 2027 310
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 AIC = 30.10
Pseudo R2 = 0.5318 BIC = -120.06
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from Informal Patient Payments dataset
Notes: Bolding used to reflect P values < 0.05. 0(0) values represent extremely low coefficient values
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share of public funding in the CHE is approximately
50% [12]), the country will witness major problems in
the healthcare system, including an increased preva-
lence of IPs. Suitable distribution of resources in the
healthcare system based on cost-effective benefit
healthcare packages and increasing the efficiency of
the health system are possible solutions mentioned by
some interviewees.
(2) Governance challenges of the Iranian health system
Many interviewees stated that a lack of trust and
transparency in the healthcare system and effort to in-
crease one’s revenue is another factor influencing the ex-
istence of IPs. Introducing different processes, such as
payment mechanisms, supervision and responsibility for
transparency and stability in payments are other ways to
increase the level of trust in the healthcare system. From
their point of view, a lack of required and essential pub-
lic and private regulations and appropriate laws are very
influential on IPs in the country. Preventing a dual prac-
tice, when physicians can work in both private and pub-
lic sector settings, is another solution suggested for IPs
elimination. Also, according to many interviewees, obey-
ing transparent legal norms and institutionalization of
professional ethics are key factors in the prevention or
reduction of IPs: “Some of the specialists perceive these
payments as their right, and they receive these types of
payments without feeling any guilt. Surgeons do not usu-
ally do the major surgery in public hospitals, and if they
do not succeed in receiving under the table payment, they
will dispatch the patient to another hospital” [Patient].
“Usually, there is no defined and strict mechanism for
managing informal payments in private hospitals. Basic-
ally, because the heads and stakeholders of the hospitals
are physicians themselves, the motivation to deal with
under the table payments does not exist. Until now, how
many physicians are prohibited from continuing their
practice because they received informal payments? None!”
[Faculty Professor]. A fewer number of interviewees said
that it is necessary to design and implement programs
that can change the attitude and people’s behaviour to
prevent appreciation for receiving healthcare through
paying IPs. “This is a tradition, or it is better to say a
culture. Our people usually give a gratuity payment or
gift to the housekeeping personnel of the hospital. Maybe
this is because they think that their income is not propor-
tional to their efforts. Also, housekeeping staff knows this
issue too. This tipping is particularly prevalent in a ma-
ternity ward. Patients and clients in the obstetric ward
usually give tips to the staff without even them asking for
it. Sometimes substitution of housekeeping staff in the
maternity ward encounters a resistance” [Senior Staff].
The interviewees reported a lack of supervision and
monitoring as a cause of IPs prevalence in the country.
MoHME should use its power to stand against the IPs,
especially after the HTP implementation, and take ser-
ious action to prevent and manage this phenomenon in
Iran. “In my opinion, eliminating/addressing [IPs], espe-
cially in the private sector, is not a priority in the health-
care system. I know some specialists that receive tariffs
that are more than those approved in their clinics. Some
doctors receive the payment for costs from insurance
companies and get some money from a patient as well,
which is more than the allowed co-payment” [MoHME’s
senior officer]. “According to the studies, more than 50
percent of outpatient services are provided in private cen-
tres, but there is no observable effective combat with IPs
in this sector either. In my opinion, the independent insti-
tution that is not under the governance of the physicians
should have this responsibility” [Specialist].
From the point of view of many interviewees, it is ne-
cessary to monitor the implementation of the revised
tariffs schedule continuously. They also referred to a sig-
nificant role of a “1690” hotline in investigating patients’
complaints about IPs and among suggested punitive
measures were: revoking medical licenses, reducing the
hospital’s accreditation score, cancelling the insurance
reimbursement contracts, dismissal of the heads of pub-
lic hospitals and cutting bonuses of violators. They also
said that by strengthening this role and more serious
fight with violators, we could be hopeful to see the dec-
rement in IPs prevalence: “If someone committed a
crime, this person must be identified and charged with it
immediately. It is not acceptable that we ignore those
who do illegal [activities]” [Health Researcher].
(3) Service delivery challenges of the Iranian health
system
Some participants said that despite changes that oc-
curred after implementing HTP, the demand for health
services in public hospitals is higher than it was in the
past. One of the reasons is that the referral system and a
family physician program has not been implemented in
full. Increased demand for health care services and fail-
ure to extend resources led to longer waiting times and
waiting lists for certain services. So, to be able to receive
high-quality services and in due time, some patients de-
cide to pay informally. One of the interviewees said: “Let
me give you a real-life example which I recently faced. I
work in a heart hospital. The number of patients seeking
angioplasty and pacemakers is high, so some must wait
several months to receive the service. What happens is
that a patient is forced to pay bribery or give a “gift”, or
something like that, to a secretary or a receptionist of a
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doctor, or a physician to reduce their waiting time” [Hos-
pital Reception Employee]. Most of the interviewees be-
lieved that the best solution to eliminate IPs is the
implementation of policies such as family physician pro-
gram and referral system: “The implementation of family
physician program can prevent the bribery and economic
offences by cutting a financial relationship between pa-
tients and a physician” [MoHME’s officer].
(4) Actors and stakeholders
Many research participants mentioned that the role of
actors, such as MoHME and insurance organizations,
could potentially have a crucial and vital role in decreas-
ing IPs, as they were involved in many reforms and pro-
cesses that occurred in the Iranian healthcare system.
Furthermore, while health insurance organizations are
expected to act as evidence-informed planners and pol-
icymakers; in reality, they seem to act only as a channel
for redistributing financial resources. Health insurance
organizations have a very passive role in determining the
quality of the provided services and the ways the pay-
ments are made. Nonetheless, most respondents noted
that health insurance organizations actually do have a
potential and should play an active role in combating
unconventional payments: “The insurance [companies]
have a crucial role in facing the phenomenon of IPs, and
they can prevent this by defending the rights of the pa-
tient and preventing paying extra costs. Strategic pur-
chasing is a strategy that can be useful in decreasing this
phenomenon in the health system” [Iran’s Medical Coun-
cil officer]. “I’m sure that if the insurance [company] ac-
complishes its responsibility to protect a patient, for
example by paying the fees to the doctors on time, doctors
will not be forced to receive the payments beyond those
defined by law” [Specialist].
Participants also mentioned that health insurance or-
ganizations and the way they arrange the reimbursement
process to the hospitals and health care providers are
very important in dealing with IPs. They think that
changes in the health insurance reimbursement level
have had a significant effect on inpatient services
utilization of public hospitals. One of the participants
said: “The reimbursement rates of public hospitals are
now higher than they used to be. But, unfortunately, in-
surance organizations pay them with some considerable
delays. Sometimes these delays can be up to two years. So
the hospitals are not able to pay to the providers in time”
[Manager of a hospital].
Some participants believed that IPs are deviating from
the norm and represent an abuse of the position. There-
fore, the supervision done by organizations including the
MoHME, health insurance organizations, the Medical
Council and other related organizations is essential as
well as co-operation in making a successful effort in
tackling IPs. “The reason for observing IPs in the offices
and different districts is the avarice of persons, so these
persons must be identified and punished” [Patient].
Another group of participants proposed that increas-
ing professional responsibility and encouraging patients
to use public sector services could be useful to control
IPs – something that is already being done in the private
sector. “To be able to tackle IPs, the infrastructure of pro-
viding health services in a public sector should be
strengthened, the Ministry of Health should use appropri-
ate regulations to eliminate IPs in the country” [Patient].
Some participants mentioned that the perceived discrim-
ination (in monetary terms) in the medical community
is another possible reason for asking IPs. One’s percep-
tion of being underpaid as compared to peers or even
other groups of health care providers validates asking
and accepting IPs, which are being seen as well as justi-
fied compensation. Participants mentioned that health
policymakers and planners should try to set the national
medical tariffs more rationally to remove this influential
factor.
Informing patients as a main stakeholder of IPs, as
well as providers regarding the consequences of asking
and giving IPs is another option for reducing the
amount of IPs. One of the participants said: “It is so im-
portant to inform patients and give enough information
regarding the different types of informal payments. It is
necessary to inform that giving different types of gifts is
also considered as a voluntary informal payment” [Policy
Advisor].
Some participants mentioned that providers have a
critical role in decreasing this phenomenon in the coun-
try. They believed that providers should use some strat-
egies to increase the professional responsibility. By
professional responsibility, they meant doctors and other
staff, improving the quality of care and avoiding getting
informal payments in any situation. Some participants
also mentioned that MoHME could use the advocacy of
other stakeholders, such as the Medical Council to elim-
inate or prevent this phenomenon in the country. “All
actors and stakeholders should work hand in hand to
eliminate this unpleasant phenomenon in the country”
[MoHME officer].
Based on the staff and patients’ views regarding the
causes of IPs, related possible practical solutions were
grouped into three themes: [1] modifying, adjusting and
applying policy interventions [2]; supervision, monitor-
ing and evaluation; and [3] actors and stakeholders
(Table 4).
Discussion
IPs remain one of the most challenging issues in Iran’s
healthcare system. Policymakers have to address this
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issue and think about suitable tailored solutions and in-
terventions to be able to control and eliminate it suc-
cessfully. This is important, as our study confirmed that
the prevalence of IPs for inpatient health care services,
even after the revision of the medical tariff schedule, is
still 14%. These findings correspond to a previously re-
ported range of IPs in the Iranian health care sector of
7–10% in a hospital department to 20–48% in the whole
hospital [17], as well as an overall level of IPs in other
countries, varying from 2 to 80% [26]. We believe that
this relatively low reported prevalence of IPs could be
reasonable, given the adjustment of the medical tariffs
and the introduction of the new hotline, which allows
for real-time feedback by patients who paid IPs and sub-
sequent actions to investigate all cases. Capturing this
change was also made possible, as our data was collected
20months following the HTP implementation.
However, we also acknowledge a possible underesti-
mation of IPs prevalence due to underreporting of such
delicate subject (due to its illegal nature following the
Iranian legislation), as well as a subjective perception of
the patient’s entitlement in regards to existing medical
tariffs. For example, despite accounting for a possible
30% non-response rate in sample size calculation, in our
study ca. 6.7% of respondents did not give consent to
continue with the interview. Also, the majority of our re-
spondents paid IPs voluntary and most frequently to
other staff (most likely to thank the underpaid staff for
their efforts), predominantly in cash and with the highest
prevalence in private hospitals, which can again reflect
the lack of knowledge regarding patients’ rights and enti-
tlements. This is despite an extensive media coverage re-
garding IPs in the health care sector, perhaps, due to an
information asymmetry between patients and providers,
as patients are not always able to distinguish between
what is a formal and what is an informal payment, and
what are the exact values of existing medical tariffs and
co-payment. As such, these payments always fall in a
shadow of ambiguity, particularly when reporting.
Our findings on the IPs prevalence in the post-HTP
implementation period seem to be somewhat lower
when compared to IPs levels of 21 to 30% reported
Table 4 Themes and subthemes related to causes and practical solutions of IPs
Theme Factors associated with IPs Proposed practical solution




Establishing a referral system and family physician program.
Eliminating the direct relationship between a patient and a provider.
Using Clinical and Ethical Guidelines.
Timely yearly notification of tariffs.
Increasing the share of health funding from the public budget.
Trust to the healthcare system Increasing transparency in processes in the health system.
Culture making Institutionalization of professional ethics.
Changing the culture of gratitude through informal payments.
Mechanisms of tariffs setting Rationalization of medical tariffs.
Setting medical tariffs based on the total cost.
Payment system Ratification of financing and payment system.
Avoiding any payment inequity between different medical groups.
Public and private regulations Preventing the employment of physicians in both public and private
sectors (avoiding dual practice).
Supervision, Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms of monitoring and
supervision
Organizing systematic supervision, monitoring and evaluation.
The proper response to patients’ complaints and following up the
demand.
The role of MoHME’s in supervision.
The supportive role, control and supervision of the Medical Council.
Mechanisms of reward and
punishment
Legislation, preventative regulation conforming with the amount of
impact.
Strict and efficient dealing with offenders and issuing timely warnings.
Actors and Stakeholders Role of actors and stakeholders The supportive role of insurance organizations from physicians and
patients.
Using the suggestions and advice of all stakeholders.
Professional responsibility.
Informing patients and other stakeholders.
Policy advocacy Strengthening the role of stewardship, regulation and policymaking of
MoHME.
Avoiding any discrimination in the medical community.
Suitable distribution of resources in the healthcare system.
Health Insurance organizations
approach
Avoid reimbursement delays in insurance claims.
Effective coverage of people.
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before the HTP implementation and the revision of the
medical tariffs [21, 27, 28]. And even though it was pre-
viously shown that prior to HTP implementation the
percentage of IPs to physicians in hospitals affiliated to
MoHME, social security organization and private sector
were 4.5, 8.1, and 12.5% respectively, and no IPs were re-
ported after tariff schedule revision [29]; we do not have
sufficient evidence to make a strong conclusion on
whether or not the new policies introduced during the
HTP implementation helped to control IPs prevalence in
the country. This is one of the limitations of the study,
given a different sampling frame, data collections tech-
niques, locales and respondents, which makes our find-
ings not directly comparable to those conducted in the
pre-HTP period. For future healthcare reforms assess-
ment, we recommend conducting well-planned and
timely evaluations, using before and after design, apply-
ing similar evaluation methodology, as well as setting up
a cohort follow-up, if possible.
We found that the prevalence of IPs was higher in pri-
vate hospitals, like previous studies conducted in Iran
and other countries [17, 22, 26, 29, 30], confirming that
the type of hospital ownership is one of the factors con-
tributing to IPs prevalence. We recommend paying more
attention when designing future policy interventions to
control IPs in the private sector as well. Additionally, we
found that while the prevalence of IPs to the physicians
was lower than in any other group of providers, physi-
cians are responsible for a substantial proportion of IPs
in the country. According to our results, most of the re-
ported IPs were done voluntarily and done to express
gratuity and appreciation for receiving high quality and
faster services. Fear of receiving a poor quality service
and a hope to get a better service was already shown to
be among the main reasons for IPs in other studies [6,
30, 31], however, analyzing such reasons was outside the
scope of this study.
Our findings indicate that IPs are still prevalent in
Iran for inpatient services even after the revision of
the medical tariff schedule. The same results were re-
ported in Mekarpour et al. study in 2018. As they
showed that IPs are still prevalent in both the out-
patient and inpatient services of Iran’s health system
and concluded that the HTP has not been entirely
successful in eradicating IPs [25]. One probable cause
of IPs can be long waiting lists to receive health ser-
vices from some physicians and a hope to get a
better-quality service. Long waiting lists could poten-
tially result from the implementation of some new
educational policies in Iran in recent years that led to
a limited number of medical students in some major
regions of the country with a decreasing specialists’
density in the country with specific profiles [32, 33].
This could explain an increased demand for receiving
health care from physicians and finally becoming a
motivational factor to request IPs. As such, the mon-
opoly of expertise is another crucial factor of the
existing prevalence of some IPs. The integration of
medical education into healthcare service stipulated
the creation of such a monopoly.
Our findings also showed that IPs are made less fre-
quently for adults than for children. We think that par-
ents are perhaps more willing to pay for their children,
and when paying for themselves, they may have more
time in circumventing the providers who may demand
informal payments, and may use services in which infor-
mal payments are less common. The evidence on the ef-
fect of age on IPs is mixed [25, 27, 34, 35]. For example,
Meskarpour-Amiri et al. reported that the elderly are at
increased risk of paying informally for health care, while
Zarei et al. found no significant relationship between the
IPs behaviour and the patient’s age.
The hospital or treatment type was another factor
contributing towards IPs prevalence and amount of
IPs, showing that the likelihood of IPs is less for
those using social security hospital services in com-
parison to those who used private hospital services.
This finding is similar to other studies that found that
the direct financial patient-physician relationship facil-
itates requesting IPs [11, 36]. The use of medical
treatment and diagnostic measures or other services
has also increased the likelihood of IPs. It seems that
this is related to the ambiguity of medical tariffs for
these types of services when compared with surgery
services.
We also observed that living in a large city increased
the probability of IPs. Living in large cities is usually ex-
pensive, while the salary levels of healthcare providers
are low. This may cause medical staff to ask for IPs to
compensate for the living costs. However, there is no
consensus in the literature about the association of the
residential area with IPs. Some of them reported that liv-
ing in the rural areas increased the likelihood of paying
IPs [7], while others stated that living in an urban area
and large cities increased the probability of paying IPs
[37]. In addition, there is some evidence showing no sig-
nificant relationship between IPs and the place of the pa-
tient’s residence [28, 30, 35, 38]. Our study provided
evidence to confirm that those living in large cities are
at increased risk of paying informally for inpatient health
care services.
Our finding also suggests that those residing in a
household where the household’s head (who are most
likely to be in charge of making any family financial de-
cisions) had high school education seemed less likely to
pay informally but more likely to pay higher amounts
than others. It implies that highly educated persons were
less likely requested to make an IP for inpatient care.
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However, if they were requested, they would pay more.
Perhaps, this reflects only their ability and/or willingness
to pay; however, previous studies also provided mixed
evidence regarding this relationship [25].
Similar to previous studies, we found that being in-
sured increases the possibility of paying IPs and its
amount as well. As Meskarpour et al. explained, it may
be due to the fact that having basic health insurance can
encourage individuals to receive more services; in such
situations, inadequate coverage of cost and services by
health insurance can lead to more cost and also IPs by
insured individuals [39]. However, some other studies
have shown that insured patients are less likely to make
IPs [7, 40].
We found that the amount of IPs is less for those pa-
tients living in a bigger household than those living in
smaller families. This is similar to the findings of previ-
ous studies [39, 41, 42]. Most likely, this is because when
the family size increases, the ability of a household to
pay for health care services costs decreases, due to the
household’s budget limitation and intra-household allo-
cations of funds. Also, we think smaller families are
more precise regarding seeking a higher quality of care
which in turn leads to being more willing to pay
informally.
Our qualitative findings that reflected the views of both
healthcare providers and health care services users con-
firmed that even though IPs frequency is not very high
after the implementation of the revised medical tariffs
schedule, IPs remain and will remain to exist. Among vari-
ous mentioned reasons were: inactivity of insurance orga-
nizations that should act as patients’ rights protectors;
inadequate funding and low medical tariffs; necessity to
revise payment mechanisms and ensure purchaser-
provider split; lack of accountability; lack of punitive mea-
sures for those who request IPs and abuse their power
and gatekeeper’s function; lack of professional ethics and
appropriate professional supervision; lack of continuous
supervision, monitoring and evaluation; and delays in re-
imbursements to the providers. A lack of healthcare
system financial resources, low salaries of healthcare pro-
viders, low potential of private sector to deliver health ser-
vices, lack of internal criteria (professional behaviour),
delays in timely payments to healthcare providers, and
some external criteria (regulations and supervision of their
enforcement) were previously reported as the main rea-
sons of requesting IPs by healthcare providers [34, 43, 44].
A complex set of measures is needed to address all
these issues in a consistent manner. One of the add-
itional measures could be an introduction of co-
payments or of “supplementary fees” on top of the offi-
cial tariffs set by the health insurance system (e.g. alike
those in Belgium and France) [45]. Improvements in the
health workforce system and its supply should also be
considered. Establishing a referral system based on the
strong primary healthcare system, implementing a family
physician program, cutting any financial relationship be-
tween health care providers and patients are among the
main interventions for controlling IPs that should be
considered by the Iranian government for future imple-
mentation. Strengthening the principles of medical eth-
ics, increasing the level of community awareness in
terms of illegal issue of IPs, refining and strengthening
the monitoring and supervision mechanisms and devel-
oping policies and laws on how to deal with providers
who request IPs, as well as increasing awareness of
healthcare providers about the negative consequences of
IPs, are other effective options in the short term to re-
duce the IPs. However, these and other possible solu-
tions would require (amongst others) strong government
commitment to tackle IPs, substantial revision and
optimization of the healthcare system financing model,
additional investment in the healthcare sector and ap-
propriate legislative base, as well as substantial informa-
tion campaigns [46]. As it is evident from a previous
study [47], the implementation of official user charges
might actually lead to a double burden and co-existence
of IPs and official charges.
We used a mixed-method approach that helped us to
gain an in-depth understanding and receive detailed in-
formation and knowledge about IPs for inpatient ser-
vices in the country. We aimed at achieving high
reliability and credibility through the triangulation of dif-
ferent sources of evidence. The data for this study was
collected during the 20 months’ period following the
HTP implementation, which could potentially be enough
to capture any relevant short-term effects. However, we
acknowledge that additional studies are needed to cap-
ture long-term effects.
As mentioned earlier, our study did not have a true
before and after design, as we used cross-sectional data.
However, as mentioned in the Introduction, HTP impact
on IPs evaluation was outside the scope of this study
and our results are in line with findings from all other
studies conducted in pre- and post-HTP periods. Recall
bias was another difficulty that we faced, as respondents
struggled to recall the exact amount they paid as IPs to
physicians. To address this potential bias, we limited the
recall period to the nearest discharge period of one
month. We also acknowledge that we did not have the
information about those participants who were re-
quested to make IPs but did not pay, particularly regard-
ing the amount they were asked to pay. These would
constitute the false negatives, particularly in a group of
those who reported not paying IPs. We tried to account
for it by using the two-part model. We did not collect
extensive data on the process of paying informally (a
time when it happened, how the amount was negotiated
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and settled, etc.), as well as other possibly important fac-
tors such as patients’ awareness, attitude, and culture to-
ward paying IPs, showing a need for more future more
detailed studies. Nonetheless, we were able to acquire a
country-representative sample from various Iranian hos-
pitals and presented not only quantitative but qualitative
findings as well.
It is worth noting that while providing exact study lo-
cations or names of the hospitals that participated in our
study could have had some relevance towards a local
policymaking process, we have chosen not to do so.
Given ethical considerations and existing guidelines and
our respect for anonymity, as well as assurances given to
participating hospitals, a decision was made not to men-
tion selected hospitals in the publication. Overall, we be-
lieve that this type of data could be of use for national
or regional benchmarking and decision making, but only
given it is being collected systematically and for all hos-
pitals, not just those selected and presented in this or
other studies. Such information can be easily misinter-
preted outside the context, especially by local and na-
tional mass media. Nonetheless, all relevant findings
were communicated to participating hospitals for in-
ternal use.
Conclusions
It seems that revising medical tariffs, as well as intensify-
ing supervision measures in the public sector through
the introduction of the hotline to report IPs could help
to decrease the prevalence of IPs. However, IPs continue
to exist with the highest prevalence in the private health
sector. Since reducing IPs is essential to ensure achieving
Universal Health Coverage, identifying factors that affect
IPs and adapting strategies that have worked in other
countries to address this issue can help to control or
eliminate IPs and promote better health for all citizens.
Some of these strategies that could be considered are
reforming the health financing, modifying the payment
mechanisms, scientific and rational revision of the med-
ical tariffs, developing laws and regulations that would
address and bring clarity regarding the IPs, increasing
motivation and accountability among health care pro-
viders, as well as better designed media campaigns about
patients’ rights and medical tariffs. A careful revision of
the basic medical package could be another recommen-
dation for health policymakers. Finally, further investiga-
tions to measure the extent of IPs in all levels of the
health care sector, analysis of multiple factors affecting
IPs, as well as examining in detail the process of paying
informally are necessary. In this regard, the health pol-
icymakers and other actors in the healthcare system
could employ the research and training capacity to sup-
port continuous monitoring and evaluation of the IPs.
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